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Abstract  - This paper examines the degree of intergenerational economic mobility in Italy. It adds to the 
growing number of international studies of the extent to which economic status is passed on across generations. 
On the basis of recent econometric innovations used in the literature, I am able to overcome some of the data 
limitations for Italy. I use the Historical Database of the Bank of Italy households survey, which contains 
information from 1977 to 2002. Retrospective information in the repeated cross-sections may be exploited by 
applying a two-sample two stage least squares estimation. 
I estimate the intergenerational income elasticity for Italy and find that mobility is limited. From an overall 
comparison, the evidence provided in this paper hints at Italy in the low-mobility group among advanced 
societies in the range of values characterising the US and the UK. The analysis of the results allows a 
characterization of interesting descriptive features in the transmission of economic status in Italy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large body of social science research has long questioned whether all individuals 
have the same opportunity to achieve social and economic success irrespective of their 
parents’ status. A rapidly expanding international literature has been investigating the 
degree to which socio-economic status is passed on between generations. Recent reviews 
of the latest efforts by both economists (see Solon 2002 and Corak 2004) and sociologists 
(Breen 2004, Breen and Jonsson 2005) find significant differences in the degree of 
inequality persistence across countries. 
Economists have tended to choose income or earnings as the preferred dimensions 
along which to characterize one’s position. The increasing literature has shed light on a 
number of problems with correctly defining and measuring intergenerational mobility 
when focusing on this particular individual dimension of social status. One criterion has 
been the estimation of single-number expressions for levels of mobility, in the form of 
degrees of association of the economic outcome of an individual with her family 
background. This can be done, for instance, by studying the relationship between the 
economic outcomes of members of the same family in different generations.  
While most of the literature regards the United States, a number of papers have 
been devoted to the analysis of the transmission of economic status in other countries 
(among others: Britain, Germany, Canada, Sweden, South Africa). International studies 
are important not only for the natural interest in characterizing an important feature of a 
country’s income inequality but also because comparisons between countries can 
contribute to an understanding of the mechanisms underlying generational income 
mobility. How are countries with different institutional settings in the labour market, 
different educational systems and different levels of cross-sectional inequality doing in 
terms of intergenerational mobility?  
In this perspective, Italy certainly represents an interesting case for comparison: its 
labor market is considered to be heavily regulated, with fairly centralized wage-setting 
institutions and a high proportion of its workforce covered by collective bargaining; the 
school system is extremely centralised and egalitarian; the level of cross-sectional income   2
inequality is lower than in the United States but higher than most Western European 
countries.
2 
Being notably characterized by limited availability of data, Italy has received 
relatively little attention in the economic literature. Lack of data has constrained previous 
studies to focus on measures of “socio-economic” condition such as occupational class or 
educational attainments.  In a widely quoted study, Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999) 
find that intergenerational mobility between occupations and between education levels in 
Italy is lower than in the United States. International comparisons by sociologists indicate 
that Italy displays low levels of intergenerational mobility in terms of social fluidity.
3  
  Taking advantage of recently developed empirical methods used to overcome 
similar data limitations in a number of other countries (Bjorklund and Jannti 1997; Dunn 
2004; Ferreira and Veloso 2004; Lefranc and Trannoy 2004), I am able to produce new 
internationally comparable estimates of the degree of intergenerational mobility in Italy. 
The evidence seems to confirm the existence of considerable intergenerational economic 
persistence. The magnitudes of the estimates are within the range of values found in the 
“least” mobile advanced countries (United States and Britain), and noticeably higher than 
those estimated in the Scandinavian countries.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic econometric 
model of the intergenerational transmission of economic status and outlines the empirical 
methods used for the estimation. Section 3 describes the data and the process of selection 
of the observations into the final samples. Section 4 presents and discusses the estimates. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measurement Issues and Methodology 
 
2.1 Econometric Model and Previous Literature 
When attempting an empirical analysis of the degree of intergenerational economic 
mobility, a large number of economic researches have looked at measures that summarize 
in a single number the joint distribution of income at two points in time. If 
s
i Y is a 
                                                 
2 See Brandolini and Smeeding (2005) on cross-national differences in economic inequality.  
3 See Breen (2004). In particular, see the chapter on Italy and the works therein cited.    3
measure of the long-run economic status of sons and 
f
i Y  the corresponding value for 






i Y Y ε β α + + =       (1) 
 
 
From which it is evident that β can be interpreted as a summary measure of the degree of 
intergenerational persistence. Conversely, 1 – β  can be thought of as a summary measure 
of intergenerational mobility.
4 
In order to estimate the relationship, a measure of the long-run economic status as 
well as a combination of representatives of two different generations is needed. Most 
authors use income or earnings as preferred measures of economic status, while fathers 
and sons are predominantly chosen to represent the two succeeding generations.
5  The 
standard linear equation (1) is the base of most empirical works in the economic 
literature. Typically, a regression of a logarithmic measure of sons’ income on a 
logarithmic measure of fathers’ income is performed. Then, the coefficient β – termed the 
intergenerational income elasticity – is estimated by applying ordinary least squares 
(OLS). By construction, the elasticity β will indicate the percent difference in sons’ 
income observed for each 1 percent difference across the incomes of the fathers. 
Conceivably, any real number could be obtained from the estimation of equation (1); a 
negative value would indicate a situation where children of parents who were high in 
their distribution of income tend to be low in their own generation distribution. On the 
contrary, a positive value would indicate intergenerational persistence of incomes where 
higher parental income is associated with higher child income. In fact, all empirical 
studies in the rich countries have found β  to lie between zero and one. Within this range, 
regression to the mean occurs, but at a rate inversely proportional to β. 
                                                 
4 See Bowles and Gintis (2002) for a possible derivation of the above formulation. Note that the elasticityβ 
differs from the intergenerational correlation coefficient r. The correlation is the regression coefficient 
multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviations of income in the two generations: r = β (σf / σs). 
5 More recently, a growing number of studies have analyzed fathers-daughters and mothers-daughters 
correlations (see Mazumder 2001 for the US). However, in this paper, I will not consider women. This is in 
order to produce estimates that are not distorted by differences in participation rates across generations, but 
also to follow the procedure in the studies to which this paper will be compared.   4
The existing evidence can be broadly split into two major waves. The earlier studies 
on the issue resulted in estimates of β at around 0.2, leading to the conclusion that 
advanced countries were characterized by strong mobility.
6 It is well recognized that the 
earlier lower estimates from these studies were biased downwards by two major 
problems. First, they relied on single-year measures of fathers’ income which, because of 
both response errors and transitory fluctuations, represent an erroneous proxy for 
permanent status.
7 The second major problem of some earlier studies depended on the use 
of particularly homogeneous samples which naturally tended to underestimate the degree 
of intergenerational persistence. Aware of these two problems, empirical studies in the 
1990’s based their analysis on representative samples and used longitudinal data. By 
averaging fathers’ earnings over more than only one year (generally five years) these 
studies reported estimates of the elasticity consistently above the previous ones (Table 
1).
8  
An alternative strategy for dealing with measurement errors in incomes is to resort 
to instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This approach consists of using one or more 
variables to instrument for father’s income or earnings (the most common variables are 
occupational status and education). The idea is that the instruments will possibly suffer 
less from transitory variation than the single-year measures of earnings, thus representing 
a better proxy for long-run economic status. The greater their ability to capture the 
variance in permanent income the better job IV estimates will do. A problem of this 
method concerns the possibility of instruments being correlated to son’s economic status 
independently of fathers’ income.  This problem will generally cause an upward bias in 
the IV estimator.
9 As a consequence, some have suggested to interpret OLS and IV 
estimates as lower and upper bound, respectively, of the true value of the 
intergenerational elasticity.
10  
                                                 
6 Belief that is best synthesized by the often-quoted presidential address to the American Economic 
Association by Gary Becker in 1988: “ In all these countries, low earnings as well as high earnings are not 
strongly transmitted from fathers to sons.”  
7 Bowles (1972) first pointed out some problems with proxying permanent income by single year measure 
of income. 
8 See Solon (1999) for a review. 
9 See Bjorklund Jantti (1997) and Solon (1992) for a formal treatment of both the multiple-years average 
and IV correction to measurement errors in permanent income.  
10 Very recent results by Mazumder (2001) cast doubt on such a conclusion. By using a larger panel of US 
Social Security Administration data, he is able to substantially increase the time span over which earnings   5
Table 1. Selection of international studies using longitudinal data 






United States     Solon (1992) 
   Solon (1992) 














UK     Dearden et al.  0.58  IV  33  47.5 
Germany     Wiegand (1997)  0.34  OLS     
Canada     Corak and Heisz (1999) 0.23  OLS  29-32  42.5 
Sweden     Osterberg (2000)  0.13  OLS  25-51  52 
Finland     Osterbacka (2001)  0.13  OLS  34.9  46 
Source: author’s selection from the review in Corak (2004). 
 
Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity also vary with the age at which 
economic status for both fathers and sons is observed (life-cycle bias). Grawe (2001) 
finds evidence of higher mobility estimates when basing his analysis on mature fathers 
rather than young fathers. Son’s age also is a concern. In particular, there seems to be a 
downward bias for those estimates based on measures of son’s earnings taken at early 
stages of their careers as showed by Reville (1995).  
 
2.2. Methodology used for estimating β in Italy 
The procedures by which the results in Table 1 are obtained are not directly 
applicable to the case of Italy. Like most countries, Italy does not have a long enough 
intergenerational panel that permit the explicit observation of father-son pairs. However, 
repeated cross-sections from household surveys can represent a good alternative, in that 
one can exploit retrospective information on parental background by sons. Among the 
parental characteristics reported by sons it is very hard to find income or earnings, while 
occupational status, level of education and other demographic characteristics are more 
common. These latter variables can be used to infer income from a sample of older men 
                                                                                                                                                 
are averaged. He thus estimates an intergenerational elasticity of earnings in the order of 0.6 or higher when 
averaging earnings over the longest period (16 years). Given these results, it is not clear whether the IV 
estimates over-balance the downward bias induced by noisy measures of permanent status.   6
(synthetic fathers) and thereby to estimate intergenerational correlations. This procedure 
is a special case of the “two sample instrumental variable” (TSIV) technique examined in 
Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Arellano and Meghir (1992).
11 Bjorklund and Jantti 
(1997) first applied this methodology to intergenerational mobility estimation (with 
Swedish and U.S. data). They performed a two stage regression based on two samples: a 
sample of sons who have reported their fathers’ socio-economic characteristics and a 
sample of adult men (pseudo-fathers) whose age is consistent with that of the actual 
fathers. Once the samples are selected, the steps required for this empirical strategy are 
the following: (i) estimate an income equation from the older sample; (ii) use the 
estimated coefficients to predict fathers’ income on the base of sons’ recollections of 
their fathers’ socio-economic characteristics; (iii) regress sons’ income on the predicted 
fathers’ income.  
Let 
f
i X  be a vector of socio-demographic characteristics of fathers as recalled by 











i υ and 
f
i X independent. Since
f
i Y cannot be directly observed from the sample of 
sons, an estimate of λ from the distinct sample of pseudo-fathers is obtained by 







j X Y υ λ + =        (3) 
 




i X Y λ ˆ ˆ = . The standard linear intergenerational regression is then performed on fathers 
predicted income 
 
                                                 
11 These authors discuss the conditions under which moments from two independent samples can be used to 





i Y Y ω β + = ˆ
1        (4) 
 
The studies of intergenerational mobility that have used this approach (see Table 2), 
provide estimates of  1 β  based on the estimation of equation (3) and (4) from separate 
samples. Inoue and Solon (2005) refer to this procedure as a computationally convenient 
two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) variant of Angrist and Krueger’s estimator. 
By analyzing the properties of the two estimators, they show that the commonly used 
TS2SLS estimator is more asymptotically efficient than the TSIV estimator and also 
more robust to differences in stratification schemes for the two samples.  
 
Table 2. Existing international studies using two-sample procedures 




United States   Bjorklund and Jantti (1997)  0.52  28-36 45 
Sweden    Bjorklund and Jantti (1997)  0.28 30-39 43.3 
France    Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) 0.41  30-40 55-70 
Brasil    Dunn (2004) 
  Ferreira and Veloso (2004) 







Source: study data from Corak (2004) and individual papers. 
 
Like the standard IV procedure, the method is most vulnerable if one of the 
predictors of father's income is itself a predictor of son's income. It is known that father’s 
education has a direct effect on son’s income and that the inclusion of more instruments 
might attenuate its potential bias (Solon 1992, Ferreira and Veloso 2004). Bjorklund and 
Jantti (1997) compare their two-sample two-stage estimate for the U.S. with the value 
found by averaging fathers’ earnings over five years on a data set in which they also have 
real fathers. The U.S. elasticities between sons’ earnings and the five-year average of 
fathers’ earnings are very close to those of Solon (1992) and are lower than the TS2SLS 
estimates (0.334-0.392 compared to 0.417-0.516). However, we noted that Mazumder   8
(2001) shows that even a five-year average of father’s income still cause a serious 
downward bias in the estimated value (suggesting that the true value of the parameter is 
about 0.6). On the basis of his study we cannot conclude that the procedure used in this 
paper over-estimates the true value of the intergenerational coefficient in Italy. 
The estimated values in Table 2 confirm the difference in mobility levels between 
Sweden and the US shown in the previous table, and point at France as a sort of 
intermediate case. Also, the results for Brazil are consistent with the conjecture of 
stronger intergenerational persistence in less developed countries.
12 
 
An alternative estimator is obtained by predicting income for both fathers and sons. 







i Z Y η θ + =        (5) 
 




i Z Y θ ˆ ˆ =  to calculate the intergenerational coefficient 






i Y Y ψ β + = ˆ ˆ




i Z  represents the vector of observable socio-demographic characteristics used 
as predictors of income in the sample of sons.  Typically the coefficient  2 β  from 
equation (6) will differ from  1 β obtained by estimating equation (4).  2 β  will measure the 
degree to which the observed components in the permanent income of fathers (
f
i X ) and 
sons (
s
i Z ) are associated. We expect  2 β  to be smaller than  1 β  in the presence of a 
positive association between fathers’ observed characteristics and the unexplained part of 
sons’ income.
13 Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) and Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) do 
indeed find lower values of the income elasticity when using the “prediction approach”. 
                                                 
12 See Solon (2002). 
13 See Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) for a formal discussion of the two estimators.   9
Finally, Italian data also permit to perform a direct OLS estimation relying on 
contemporaneous income report by co-residing fathers and sons.
14 Obviously, this sample 
will be smaller and less representative of all individuals, possibly leading to display a 
different intergenerational income association than would a more representative sample.
15 
Generally, the use of single-year measures of fathers income, the observation of relatively 
younger sons and of older fathers will tend to underestimate the true intergenerational 
coefficient. For co-residing pairs, I regress the natural log of sons’ income on the natural 
log of fathers’ income with controls for age and age squared for both fathers and sons, as 














i agesq age agesq age y y ε α α α α β α + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 3 0    (7) 
  
I will interpret the estimates obtained from this procedure as providing a lower 
bound to the true intergenerational income elasticity. 
 
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
 
In this paper, I use data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW), a nationally representative household survey based on a random sample 
of approximately 8,000 households per year, that is available form 1977 annually and at 
odd years after 1987. The SHIW is the only easily accessible source of micro data on 
income that spans over this long period. Brandolini (1999) describes Italian data sources 
and concludes that the SHIW still represents the best source of income distribution in 
Italy.
16 In order to enhance comparisons over time, the Bank of Italy has constructed a 
Historical Database, elaborating data from the 1977 survey and addressing the numerous 
                                                 
14 Hertz (2001) uses South-African household surveys data on pairs of parents and sons living in the same 
household to calculate the intergenerational correlation in earnings. He finds very low levels of mobility. 
15 In the following section, I compare the “co-residing” samples to the larger samples and I discuss the 
possible implications on the estimated values. 
16 As with most survey data, major problems of SHIW regard the pattern of non-responses, mis-reporting of 
earnings and a relatively small sample size.   10
changes the SHIW questionnaire has undergone over the years.
17  In the recent waves of 
the survey, head of households are asked to recall some characteristics of their parents 
(among which there are year of birth, educational qualifications and employment status). 
The information for fathers is indicatively referred to the same current age of the 
respondent.  
All income is recorded net of taxes and social security contributions, with separate 
records for each recipient along with basic individual characteristics such as age, sex, 
education, work status and employment sector.  In what follows, I will use annual net 
disposable personal income from the historical database.
18  This includes earned income 
from wages, salaries, and self-employment and other cash income from property, but 
does not include income from financial assets.
19 This income definition is narrower than 




3.1. Sample selection 
The sample of fathers is taken from the survey conducted in 1977, which is the 
oldest wave of the SHIW available. The selection of fathers into the final sample tries to 
follow the standard procedure adopted in most of the similar studies of economic 
mobility. I consider employed males who are head of households and father of at  least a 
co-resident child. I include all fathers aged 30 to 50 (i.e. born between 1927 and 1947).
21 
Following the majority of previous studies, individuals who report a non-positive income 
are excluded, for a final first-stage sample of 953 individuals. 
                                                 
17 It has been necessary to standardize the main variables to give continuity over the 20 years. The archive 
is comprised of two sections: one with the basic characteristics as originally gathered, and one with derived 
files on income aggregated according to homogenous rules at the individual level and a set of adjusted 
weights. See  D’Alessio and Gallo (1997), and D’Alessio (1997). 
18 I also run separate regressions controlling for the under-reporting by self-employed individuals. This is 
done by using the discrepancy between reported post-tax income from self-employment and the 
corresponding values based on the national accounts. 
19 The compensation for employees includes overtime payments and bonuses, while self employed and 
entrepreneurial income accounts for depreciation. 
20 Previous studies have found evidence of higher intergenerational coefficients for broader income 
concepts. See Mulligan (1997), Corak and Heisz (1999) and Mazumder (2001). 
21 Information on age in the earlier waves is recorded by classes. In order to obtain a reasonable sample 
size, I choose to utilize two classes: 30-40, 41-50.   11
The sample of sons is taken form the 2002 SHIW, which is the most recent wave 
available at the time of the present research. They are male heads of household aged 30 to 
45, whose fathers’ were born between 1927 and 1947. Consistently with studies of 
mobility in other countries, I consider employed individuals with positive income and a 
report of their fathers’ socio-demographic characteristics for a final sample of 612 sons. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for both samples and the magnitude of sample 
exclusions in the population under consideration.  
We note that once the standard sample exclusions are made, individuals seem to 
maintain similar characteristics compared to the reference group. Selected sons appear to 
have higher levels of income with respect to all males in the same age range. The results 
may thus be biased by the selection of unrepresentatively high-earnings groups. 
However, given the correspondence of the above procedure with the standard exclusions 
adopted in the literature, the extent of the selection biases should be consistent with that 
of the studies to which my results aim to be compared. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for selected fathers and sons 
  Pseudo-Fathers (1977)  Sons (2002) 




All Males 30-45 in 2002 
(whose fathers were born b/w 
1927-1947) 
Selected sample 
   N  1133  953  733  612 
















Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Income is in 2002 Euros, deflated by the consumer price index. 
 
 
3.2. First stage variables 
To perform the first two empirical estimations described in section 2, I need a set 
of observable variables from the recall information in 2002 that I can use in the first stage 
sample for predicting fathers’ income. I use a the following categorical variables:   12
educational attainments; occupational status and geographic area.
22 Information on 
education is in term of maximum educational achievements. There are six categories: no 
school (less than one year of schooling); elementary (five years); lower secondary school 
(eight years); high school (thirteen years); bachelor (seventeen-eighteen), and post 
graduate studies (more than eighteen years of education).
23 Contrary to most similar 
studies, the occupational categories are not recoded following a social class schema. As 
noted by Checchi and Dardanoni (2002) the SHIW data does not provide a detailed 
classification of occupational status, making it difficult to construct a ranking of 
occupation based on social prestige or any other social grading. Furthermore, the detail of 
information on work status and sector of activity in the fathers’ sample does not perfectly 
match with the characteristics sons are asked to recall in 2002. In order to perform my 
analysis, I rearrange the more disaggregated information on work status recalled by the 
children to be comparable with the available classification for parents. A similar 
rearrangement is effectuated for the variable “employment sector” where sons 
recollections are less detailed than the information directly observed from fathers. As a 
result, based on the available information, I obtain four work status categories (blue 
collar, office workers/teachers, managers/professionals/entrepreneurs, self-employed) and 
four sectors of employment (agriculture, industry, public administration, private 
services). The last variable is a geographic dummy, which indicates whether the father 
was residing in the South.
24 
The relationship between the observable characteristics and income in the pseudo-
fathers sample is assumed to be valid for the true fathers. Since this cannot be verified, 
we check if the distribution of the characteristics self-reported in the 1977 sample is 
consistent with the distribution of the characteristics recollected by the sons. Table 4 
compares fathers’ own reported characteristics with sons’ recollections. 
The distributions appear to be consistent. The existing differences are of the same 
nature found in previous studies that use this technique. In particular, pseudo-fathers 
                                                 
22 Most similar studies have used one or more of these variables.  
23 There are no individuals with postgraduate education in the fathers sample. 
24 I include this variable in order to account for the well-known geographic disparities in Italy. Considering 
a larger set of geographical areas only have a minor impact on estimates. While I can observe directly the 
area of residence in the sample of pseudo-fathers, I do not have the same information for the actual fathers. 
I use sons’ place of birth as a proxy for the geographic area where the sons were mainly living when they 
grew up .   13
have, on average, higher schooling and more skilled occupations than the actual fathers. 
Typically, these discrepancies are ascribed to differential childbearing according to 
occupation and educational attainment.
25 Solon and Inoue (2005) note that the TS2SLS 
estimator implicitly corrects for differences between the two samples in the distribution 
of the observable characteristics.
26 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for fathers and pseudo-fathers. 
 




report of their 
characteristics 




Education    
None 0.08  0.06 
Elementary 0.53  0.50 
lower secondary  0.25  0.25 
high school  0.11  0.13 
Bachelor 0.03  0.06 
Work Status    
blue collar  0.47  0.47 
office worker & teacher  0.17  0.19 
manager/profess/entrepr. 0.11  0.06 
self-employed   0.25  0.28 
Work sector    
Agriculture 0.16  0.08 
Industry 0.30  0.44 
public administration  0.14  0.14 
private services  0.40  0.34 
Area    
north/centre 0.65  0.69 
South 0.35  0.31 
         Notes: All frequencies are weighted using sampling weights 
 
 
                                                 
25 To the extent that fathers with many sons are over-represented in the sample of sons, the differences are 
to be expected when occupation and education are correlated with the number of sons. 
26 Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) too comment that given the nature of the exercise the results are not likely to 
be biased by these disparities.   14
3.3. Co-residing samples 
The direct OLS estimate for co-residing father-son pairs is obtained from a different 
sample. I construct a sample of 231 pairs from the 2002 survey among those individuals 
who were employed and reporting positive income.
27 Table 5 reports summary statistics 
for selected individuals. 
  
Table 5. Characteristics of co-residing sample 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
The sample mean age for sons in 2002 is 25, while the sample mean for fathers is around 
53. Because sons are observed at an earlier stage of the life cycle their mean income is 
lower. Compared to the previous sample, these sons are younger and their fathers are 
older. On the basis of the existing literature, both age differences are likely to cause lower 
estimated values for β. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Regression results 
Table 6 reports regression coefficients for the intergenerational income equation for 
Italy. The values shown are the results of the estimation of equation (1) under the three 
measurement procedures outlined in section 2. First-stage estimates of fathers’ income 
are shown in table A1 in the appendix. 
                                                 
27 I exclude observations from households where more than one co-residing child is working and earning a 
positive income. 
 2002 
 Fathers  Sons 
N 231  231 
 
Mean age  53.36  
(5.78) 
25.10    
(4.29) 
 
Mean log income  9.97     
(0.55) 
9.19     
(0.58)   15
In the light of the coefficients reported in Table 6, intergenerational persistence of 
economic status in Italy appear to be high and significant.
28 The TS2SLS estimate of β is 
0.479 or 0.509 depending on whether or not I control for age of both fathers and sons. 
Broadly speaking, this indicates that about half of the economic advantage of Italian 
fathers is passed on to their children. As expected, the values obtained predicting incomes 
for both generations are lower: 0.333-0.339. Both pairs of values are of a similar 









uncorrected for age 
 
corrected for age 
1. TS2SLS  





2. Predicted incomes 






3. Co-residing  







Notes: Bootstrapping standard errors are in parenthesis. Incomes are predicted by educational, 
occupational and geographical dummies. Tables with full regression results are available on 
request. 
 
I check these results against various sensitivity tests. Tables A2-A5 in the appendix 
show the results from a number of alternative regressions estimating the coefficients in 
rows 1-2. Choosing different years for fathers income does not significantly alter its 
effect on sons income (Table A2, upper panel). Coefficients do not drastically vary either 
when using sons from the 2000 survey wave (Table A2, lower panel). If anything, the 
                                                 
28 To calculate standard errors, I use the bootstrap procedure. First, I draw a bootstrap first-stage sample of 
fathers, from which I estimate the parameters used to generate predicted incomes. Then a bootstrap sample 
of sons is drawn and used for running the second-stage regression on fathers predicted incomes. After 
repeating this process 1000 times, the bootstrap standard error is estimated by the standard deviation of the 
distribution of the bootstrap estimates. 
29 Their TS2SLS values are 0.417-0.516, while the estimates obtained by predicting both incomes are 
0.294-0.327. Note that their corresponding values for Sweden (uncorrected for age) are 0.282 and 0.216 
respectively.   16
estimates from the selected pair of years (2002-1977) are slightly lower than the averaged 
values across the alternative regressions. Results did not dramatically change for minor 
variations of the age at which we observe sons (Table A3) and were not sensitive to a 
rough correction for under-reporting of self-employed income (table A4).
30 Somewhat 
more variations is found when we test for different sets of predictors of income. 
However, even in a slightly larger range of values, the results still point to low level of 
overall mobility in Italy (Table A5). The fact that persistence is high even when 
education is not included in the predictors of father’s income (row 2), excludes the 
possibility of a serious upward bias in my preferred estimate.
31 
Returning to Table 6, the coefficient in row 3 is obtained form the estimation of 
equation (7) using the smaller sample of co-residing father-son pairs in 2002. We confirm 
our expectations of lower estimates when using single-year measures of fathers income, 
relatively younger sons and older fathers.
32  As a check, I construct a similar sample for 
the year 2000 and I find a very similar value.
33 The estimates have to be treated with 
caution, however, given that the samples are of limited size and possibly unrepresentative 
of the reference population. 
 
4.2. Mobility Matrix 
An alternative way to characterize intergenerational mobility is provided by 
mobility matrices. I can use my estimates to construct a mobility matrix for Italy. This 
approach relies on discrete categorizations and investigates the conditional probabilities 
of transition among ordered income quantiles/groups. Table 7 gives the fraction of sons 
in each income quartile given the predicted income quartile of their fathers. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Following Checchi and Dardanoni (2002), I revise income from self-employment upward by 40%. This 
is the discrepancy of self-employment figures with corresponding values based on national accounts 
averaged over the period 1980-93. 
31 Note also that we confirm previous findings of higher estimates when income is predicted solely by 
education (row 6). 
32 Note that these values are close to those found by Comi (2004) using a very young sample of children 
from the European Community Household Panel. She excludes self-employed individuals and uses a 
narrower definition of earnings, reporting a coefficient of 0.27 from her random effect estimate of the 
intergenerational relationship. 
33 The elasticity is equal to 0.336 for a sample of n = 268 individuals.   17








st 38.53 33.82 17.20 10.45 
 
2
nd 26.82 26.08 30.26 16.84 
 
3
rd  22.53 27.68 28.57 21.23 
 
4
th 12.64 11.81 25.36 50.19 
Notes: Values expressed in percentages. 
 
Each cell in Table 6 can be interpreted as the probability for a son to be in quartile 
i
th, conditional on his father’s being in quartile j
th. The information in Table 6 enables to 
investigate about the direction and the pattern of mobility in a way that cannot be 
accomplished by mean regression measures. We note strong persistence a the extremes of 
the conditional distribution of sons’ income. About 38.5% of sons remain in the bottom 
income quartile if their fathers were in that quartile. Even more persistence is displayed at 
the top of the distribution, where about more than half of sons of fathers in the richest 
quartile remained at the top. Interestingly, upward mobility from the bottom of 
distribution seems more likely than downward mobility from the top, suggesting some 
asymmetry in mobility patterns. More mobility is displayed in the central cells of the 
matrix, where moves between adjacent quartiles seem to be likely in both directions.  
Given the skewness of the income distribution, income quartiles may group 
together relatively diverse incomes. To control for this possibility, I use a different 
aggregation strategy to construct four income classes for both fathers and sons: (i) low-
income, which includes individuals with income below two-thirds of the median; (ii) 
lower-middle, from higher incomes up to the median; (iii) higher-middle, for incomes 
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income 20.14 51.37 19.87  8.63 
Lower 
middle  11.59 47.38 29.32 11.71 
Higher 
middle  11.75 35.12 26.98 26.14 
High-
income  2.83  11.15 38.07 47.95 
Notes: Values expressed in percentages. 
 
Table 8 replicates the previous table in terms of the new classification. We note that 
the main mobility patterns do not vary. The existence of a “wealth trap” is confirmed, 
with richer people being very likely to pass on their economic status to their children. The 
probability to move up to the two highest classes from the bottom is 28.5% against a 
probability of 86.02 %  to be there from the top. Stated differently, rags to the rich is far 
from a credible possibility for most low-income Italians. Poorer individuals have higher 
chances to move upwardly in the lower part of the matrix so that the persistence in the 
first class is not particularly high. The overall picture emerging from the above matrices 
is consistent with the findings of Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999) based on 
different data and a different analytical procedure.
34 
 
4.3. Family background and educational attainments 
Considering the way higher education is financed in Italy, high levels of economic 
persistence may appear as a rather surprising result. In Italy, access to higher education 
by poor families is facilitated by a largely public system financed through taxation. We 
would then expect parental income not to be critical for children’s educational 
attainments, as students from low income families do not have the additional 
disadvantage of a low expenditure in education decided by parents. Table 9 reports mean 
fathers’ income (in logs) for five classes of sons’ educational attainments. It shows the 
existence of a relationship between levels of education and fathers’ income, with 
graduates having on average richer fathers. What can be said about the role of this 
                                                 
34 They present the matrices of transition between occupational income classes defined as proportions of 
equal size of the log-difference between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes.   19
relationship in the transmission of economic status in Italy? Is it possible to evaluate the 
income persistence through superior educational attainments of richer children?  
      
          Table 9. Sons’ educational attainments and fathers’ income 
Son’s education  Mean fathers’ log income 





high school  9.76 
bachelor 9.90 
 
For the U.S., Bowles and Gintis (2002) seek to uncover the channels through which 
parental incomes influence offspring incomes by decomposing the intergenerational 
correlation into additive components reflecting the contribution of various mechanisms. I 
follow their strategy to estimate the size of the “education channel” in the transmission of 
economic status. This will allow me to assess how much of the intergenerational 
correlation is accounted for by the fact that richer parents have higher educated children. 
Suppose that fathers’ income (
f
i Y ) directly affects sons’ income (
s
i Y ), but sons’ income 
is also affected by sons’ education (
s
i E ), which is correlated with fathers’ income. It is a 
property of correlation coefficients to be decomposable into additive parts: the 
intergenerational correlation (or the intergenerational income elasticity) can be expressed 
as the sum of the standardized regression coefficients of fathers’ income (
s fY Y β ) and 
children education (
s sY E β ) in a multiple regression predicting 
s
i Y , each multiplied by the 
correlation between 
f
i Y  and the regressor (which for fathers’ income itself is just 1).
 35 
 
s s s f s f s f Y E E Y Y Y Y Y r r β β + =  
 
                                                 
35 A standardized regression coefficient is the change in the dependent variable, in standard deviation units, 
associated with a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.   20
The education component of this decomposition (
s s s f Y E E Y r β ) of the intergenerational 
correlation is called an indirect effect, while the direct effect of fathers’ income is the 
standardized regression coefficient of fathers’ income from this regression (
s fY Y β ).  Note 
that this decomposition should only be seen as a descriptive device along the lines 
suggested in Bowles and Gintis (2002) and not as an analysis of causal effects. I estimate 
the size of these direct and indirect effects by applying this decomposition to my estimate 
of the intergenerational regression coefficient (uncorrected for age). 
 
0.48 = 0.345  +  0.135 
(total)  =  (direct effect)  +  (indirect effect) 
 
The above simple exercise shows that only a small fraction (less than one third) of 
the intergenerational coefficient is accounted for by the fact that the children of rich 
parents are also more educated. In other words, assuming that the only channel of 
intergenerational income correlation would work through the association of father’s 
income and child’s education, the income regression coefficient for our sample of Italian 
men would be equal to 0.135. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
The level of intergenerational mobility is seen by many as a measure of the extent 
of equality of opportunity in a society, and has clear implications on the study of poverty 
persistence. This paper is an empirical analysis of the degree of intergenerational 
economic mobility in Italy. Data limitations have restricted mobility studies on Italy: 
there is not a longitudinal survey that is long enough to provide information on actual 
incomes of both parents and children. Recent econometric innovations employed in the 
literature permit to overcome some of the data problems for Italy and to use the Historical 
Database of the Bank of Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth. Retrospective 
information in the repeated cross-sections are exploited by applying a two-sample two 
stage least squares estimation. The remaining limitations of the database (mis-reporting   21
of incomes, measurement errors and changes of definitions through the years) are 
addressed by performing several auxiliary regressions. 
When comparing the results of this study with those obtained from other countries, 
one has to be aware that cross-country comparisons of intergenerational mobility are very 
difficult. This is essentially due to the fact that international comparisons have much 
more severe data requirements than single-country studies. The main prerequisite is 
comparability of results, which demands for similar information on both fathers and sons 
income, as well as for special attention on sample selection rules applied to the datasets. 
If comparative studies do not attempt a parallel analysis for the countries involved then it 
is difficult to say whether differences in the intergenerational income persistence reflect 
true differences in mobility or are driven by different income measures, age ranges or 
other sample selection criteria.  
Looking at the results from the existing studies that have used similar estimation 
procedures, the findings of this paper indicate that Italy displays levels of economic 
persistence that are most similar to United States and United Kingdom. Italy appears to 
be markedly less mobile than Sweden. More international evidence is available if we 
consider also the studies that used different data and methodologies. Corak (2004) does a 
thorough review of the international literature regarding rich countries, with an explicit 
comparative perspective. He puts together a set of comparable estimates across a number 
of countries, taking into account the specifics of different studies’ design.
36 Although it is 
not possible to rank countries in a rigorous way according to their level of “overall” 
mobility, it is probably fair to conclude that among rich countries, Scandinavian countries 
and Canada are the most mobile societies. At the other extreme, the United States and the 
United Kingdom stand out as being the least mobile societies, with 40% to 50% of 
fathers’ income advantage being passed on to sons. 
From an overall comparison, the evidence provided in this paper hints at Italy in the 
low-mobility group among advanced societies. Taking account of the possible biases 
arising from the data and the procedure adopted, the estimated value for Italy would lie in 
the range of values found in the U.S. and the U.K. Obviously, this evidence has to be 
                                                 
36 Specifically, he accounts for the fact that the results differ according to the extent measurement errors are 
corrected, and to the point in the life cycle where parental income is obtained.   22
considered suggestive, not conclusive, as richer data and different estimation methods 
have demonstrated to significantly improve the reliability of the estimates in several 
countries. However, my results are consistent with the image of Italy as a “rigid” society 
that had emerged from previous studies by both sociologists and economists.
37  
Various tentative explanations of the low mobility in Italy can be suggested. I find 
that the inheritance process operating through superior educational attainments of those 
with well-off parents, while important, explains less than one third of the 
intergenerational transmission of economic status. This result gives credibility to the 
hypothesis that in Italy equally educated children have different chances to obtain highly 
paid jobs depending on their family background. In other words, education does not fulfil 
a substantial signalling function. The fact that the Italian labor market is characterised by 
the presence of extensive barriers to entry into a wide range of occupations might play an 
important role.
38 The poor selectivity and high standardization of the Italian higher 
education can also be blamed for depriving poorer children of a tool to signal their ability 
and to compete with children from richer families, who can benefit from parental 
connections.
39  This result may appear puzzling to the extent that a public education 
system is expected to favour intergenerational mobility. As a matter of fact, countries can 
differ significantly in the impact that education spending may have on intergenerational 
mobility. It will depend on a larger set of “intangible” advantages richer parents are able 










                                                 
37 See Section 1. 
38 See Schizzerotto and Bison (1996). 





Table A1. First-stage regression of pseudo-fathers income on four categorical variables (1977)   
N = 953 
R
2 = 0.3285
Variable coefficient  robust  st.err.  t 
Education     
elementary school  0.181 0.078  2.34 
lower secondary school  0.271 0.084  3.24 
high school  0.474 0.094  5.06 
bachelor  0.708 0.108  6.53 
Work status     
office worker/teacher  0.135 0.044  3.05 
manager/professional/entrepreneur 0.499 0.098  5.07 
Self-employed   0.258 0.045  5.78 
Sector     
industry  0.329 0.073  4.5 
public administration  0.210 0.077  2.72 
private services  0.360 0.078  4.6 
Geographic dummy     
south  -0.199 0.036  -5.46 
Const.      9.076 0.082  110.33 















Table A2. Two-sample estimates for different pairs of years for fathers and sons.  
  
Sons sample: 2002 
pseudo-fathers  sample  1978 1979 1980 
  (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 


























Sons sample 2000 
pseudo-fathers sample  1977  1978  1979 
  (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 

























Notes: Bootstrapping standard errors are in parenthesis. Incomes are predicted by educational, occupational 
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Table A3. Two-sample estimates for different age ranges for sons. 
  fathers age: 30-50 









  (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 



































Notes: Bootstrapping standard errors are in parenthesis. Incomes are predicted by educational, occupational and 












uncorrected for age 
 
corrected for age 
1. TS2SLS  







2. Predicted incomes 








3. Co-residing  







Notes: Bootstrapping standard errors are in parenthesis. Incomes are predicted by educational, 









Table A5. Estimated Intergenerational Elasticities (2002-1977) for different sets of predictors of 
income 
Predicting variables  2S2SLS  Predicted Incomes 
 (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
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